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HELL, VAGUENESS, AND JUSTICE:
A REPLY TO SIDER
Trent Dougherty and Ted Poston

Ted Sider's paper "Hell and Vagueness" challenges a certain conception of
Hell by arguing that it is inconsistent with God's justice. Sider's inconsistency
argument works only when supplemented by additional premises. Key to
Sider's case is a premise that the properties upon which eternal destinies su
pervene are "a smear," i.e., they are distributed continuously among individ
uals in the world. We question this premise and provide reasons to doubt it.
The doubts come from two sources. The first is based on evidential consider
ations borrowed from skeptical theism. A related but separate consideration
is that supposing it would be an insurmountable problem for God to make
just (and therefore non-arbitrary) distinctions in morally smeared world, God
thereby has sufficient motivation not to actualize such worlds. Yet God also
clearly has motivation only to actualize some member of the subset of nonsmeared worlds which don't appear non-smeared. For if it was obvious who
was morally fit for Heaven and who wasn't, a new arena of great injustice is
opened up. The result is that if there is a God, then he has the motivation and
the ability to actualize from just that set of worlds which are not smeared but
which are indiscernible from smeared worlds.

Ted Sider's paper "Hell and Vagueness"1 challenges a certain conception
of Hell by arguing that it is inconsistent with God's justice. Sider's inconsis
tency argument works only when supplemented by additional premises.
We lay out the inconsistency argument, supplement it, and then argue
that one key additional premise—the existence thesis—is unsupported.
The Inconsistency A rgu m en t

Sider's aim is to show that several propositions describing the require
ments of justice and a common conception of Hell are jointly inconsistent.
First, there are the propositions describing a "binary" conception of the
afterlife:
Dichotomy (D): there are exactly two states in the afterlife, Heaven and
Hell.
Badness (B): Hell is much worse than Heaven.
Non-universality (NU): Both Heaven and Hell are populated.
Divine Control (DC): God decides according to some criterion C who
goes to Heaven and who goes to Hell.

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 25 No. 3 July 2008
All rights reserved

322

HELL, VAGUENESS, AND JUSTICE

323

Second, there are two propositions describing the nature of God and the
nature of justice.
Divine Justice (DJ): God will not violate the proportional nature of
justice.
Proportionality (P): Similar cases deserve similar treatment.
These propositions describe what we take to be a sufficiently accurate pic
ture of one fairly common conception of Hell and the nature of divine
justice. Yet, these propositions are not inconsistent. A step in the direction
to inconsistency is to add the following premise.
Borderline (BL): Any application of a just criterion must judge created
beings according to a standard that comes in degrees or admits of bor
derline cases.
Sider asserts that this addition to the set of propositions mentioned above
generates an inconsistency.2 The thought seems to be this. By (NU), (DC),
(DJ), (BL) and (B) God has decided according to a just criterion that comes
in degrees that certain individuals are in a much worse condition than
others. But this conflicts with (P) because some individuals are close to the
borderline and certain of those individuals go to Hell while others go to
Heaven. Thus we have an inconsistency.
This explication, though, has tacitly introduced another premise, the
premise that there are some individuals that are relevantly similarly who
receive dissimilar treatment. We shall call this the existence thesis.
Existence Thesis (E): There are some individuals in the actual world
such that they are relevantly very similar in respects pertaining to the
condition C specified in (DC), yet who end up in radically different
eternal destinations.
We shall argue that (E) is groundless and upon sufficient reflection im
plausible.
There are other possible responses to Sider's argument. One may mo
tivate a denial of the proportionality principle,3 one may motivate an
epistemicist response to this problem,4 or one may argue that "whimsical
generosity" is not objectionable.5Though we think each of these responses
plausible, we judge that our response is stronger than any of these re
sponses because our argument retains all the original premises of Sider's
argument.
Our arguments works like this: We maintain that God can satisfy the
requirements of justice described by (DJ) and (P) within the constraints of
the targeted doctrine of Hell. This may be done by ensuring that (BL) has
no teeth. That (BL) has no bite is ensured by the falsity of (E).
On the E xistence Thesis

In the following we adduce a consideration against (E). Reflection sug
gests little reason to endorse (E).
Consider the following parable (perhaps best read with a British accent,
in the style of Monty Python).
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Angel Parable
God is about to create the world. After looking through a large dossier
of possible worlds, just as he is about to say the magic words "Fiat w"
Gabriel interrupts, "Ahem, Sir, if you don't mind my saying so don't
forget to make sure only to actualize a world in which people differ
sufficiently in respects pertaining to their position in the afterlife."
"What do you mean?" God says "Speak plain English why don't
you! Preferably King James English . . . just kidding, I do have a sense
of humor you know."
"Certainly, Sir. It's just that you don't want people so close to one an
other in respects of salvation that you have to make an arbitrary choice as
to whether they go to Heaven or Hell, that would smack of injustice."
"Ah, very well, I see what you mean," says God and then is again
about to issue the Fiat when Michael interrupts, "Um, Lord, pardon me
for saying so, I'm sure you'll have thought of this, but you also don't
want to actualize a world in which the gaps are discernable to them. The
last thing you want is for it to be clear to all who's got an advantage on
whom. They'll no doubt argue about such things anyway, but as long as
it's hard to tell no one will have the upper hand. Not to mention the di
sasters that could occur from people trying to consign the Hell-bound to
their fate prematurely. It will be hard for such beings not to play God."
"Hmm, very good point. Now before I get started, does anyone else
have anything they'd like to say," God asks.
Harold then points out, "Actually, you could save yourself the
trouble—though of course it would be no trouble to you—of looking
for a world with moral joints between individuals just large enough
for you to make non-arbitrary decisions yet just small enough for hu
mans not to see them by picking a world with a gap anywhere below
a point where people determinately deserve Hell. Then send everyone
above that point to Heaven. They will get more than they deserve, and
to varying degrees at that, but no one will have anything to complain
about, because they'll all get more than they deserve."
"I like it!" says God "I'm glad someone has an eye for efficiency
around here!"
Sider's inconsistency argument assumes that the actual world is not
S(oteriologically)-gappy.6 We now question that assumption. Sider says it
is "manifestly false" that the actual world is S-gappy, for "every morally
or spiritually relevant factor we encounter in our lives is quite clearly a
smear."7 That's a pretty confident assertion on a matter which seems to us
not an easy matter to judge. "But the LORD said to Samuel, 'Do not look
at his appearance or at his physical stature, because I have refused him.
For the LORD does not see as man sees; for man looks at the outward ap
pearance, but the LORD looks at the heart" (1 Samuel 16:7 NKJV). Sider
looks at the world and sees no S-gaps. He doesn't say what he's looking for
when he does this. We have no theory about what exactly the S-relevant
features are according to which one is judged, but we expect that it will be
quite complex and "hidden from the eyes of man."8
This is a case where absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of
absence. We must consider the probability that we would see gaps if they
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were there. For if the probability of our seeing gaps conditioned on their
existence is low, then our not seeing them will not necessarily count as
evidence against their existence. It is like Plantinga's case of the noseeums,
the tiny buzzing insects which frequently pester campers. While we have
a reason to expect that we'd notice, say, an Irish wolfhound in the tent,
we have no corresponding reason to think we'd spot a noseeum.9 This
argument is directly parallel to the issue of so-called "skeptical theism"
in the literature on the problem of evil.10 This is not the place to rehash
that argument, but suffice it to say that this is a key weakness in Sider's
argument (especially since the move is on considerably more firm ground
here than in the case of evil). The assumption that the actual world is not
S-gappy is essential to his argument, yet he claims to know this contingent
fact empirically, even though—as the Creation Parable makes clear and
the noseeum case illustrates—on the traditional account which is under
fire there is no good reason to expect the gaps to be manifest.
This line of thought is open to the objection that S-relevant features
supervene on moral features and M-relevant features are continuous.
This objection, however, only relocates the problem (or perhaps just lo
cates it). For the original line of reasoning applies just as well to moral
status. We can observe people's behavior, but not their intentions, mo
tives, regrets, or a host of factors that determine whether a person has
the relevant moral characteristics. True, we do sometimes infer people's
intentions—as best we can—from their observed behavior. But even in
cases in which this succeeds there are other hidden factors that affect
moral character. Anyone who has done even a modicum of inner moral
scrutiny realizes clearly that most moral struggles are within. There is
a huge difference morally between performing an action on motives of
which you don't fully approve and deeply regretting it afterwards and
performing a type-identical action fully endorsing the same motives and
without any regret.
Furthermore, it seems to us that the features of persons upon which
moral character supervene are both more fine-grained than beliefs and de
sires and of a higher order. It is plausible that it is morally blameworthy to
hold certain beliefs.11 If so, it could be more morally reprehensible to hold
them to a greater degree. For example, the person that has just enough
credence to count as believing that members of a certain race are inferior
is not as badly off morally as someone who feels certain of it, if it is a cer
tain kind of moral sensitivity on their part which blocks further credence.
Yet our method of inferring beliefs from behaviors cannot always detect
the granularity of a belief. For someone living in a racist community the
disutility of acting contrary to those racist precedents will obscure the dif
ference between barely believing it and being convinced of it.
Moreover, though our inferences from behavior might reasonably im
plicate certain beliefs and desires, they will ordinarily not provide insight
into higher-order states such as whether the individual believes their be
liefs or desires to be objectionable or desires to have certain beliefs and
desires. Yet both one's degrees of confidence and one's higher-order states,
we submit, are surely factors relevant to the assessment of their moral
character. To illustrate this, we present a contrast between two individuals
who exhibit identical actions and have the same course-grained mental
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profile but form a marked contrast with respect to the finer-grained and
higher-order considerations we advert to.
Brutal Bart
Brutal Bart goes into his former workplace (where he was recently
fired), shoots his old boss, takes the petty cash fund, and runs. Bart
believes he has a right to the money since he'd worked there for a full
year without a raise. He desired to shoot his boss and take the money
and believed he could get away with it. He has certitude that his boss
forfeited his life when he fired him and no reservations about what he
has done.
Reluctant Ralph
Ralph goes into his former workplace (where he was recently fired),
shoots his old boss, takes the petty cash fund, and runs. Ralph be
lieves he has a right to the money since he'd worked there for a full
year without a raise. He desired to shoot his boss and take the money
and believed he could get away with it. However, Ralph is just barely
convinced he has a "right" to the money since he sees that his Boss had
a legitimate grievance with him. In fact, when he thinks about it, he
believes this belief is probably not justified, though it persists. Further
more, he believes his desire to do this is one he should not have and
in fact desires not to have this desire. After he has done it, he deeply
regrets it, believing it to have been a wicked act and desiring that he
could undo his wrong.
We think this contrast represents the possibility of undetectable mental
bases of moral character which provide reason to doubt our ability to
make the kinds of judgments necessary to support Sider's smear thesis.
We conclude that Sider's "smear" thesis is thus a dubious and unargued
assumption.
There is, however, another reply to our argument that only invokes
the possibility of S-gappiness. Sider thinks that the mere possibility of Sgappiness is sufficient to undermine either the traditional conception of
Hell or the conception of divine justice. He reasons:
One . . . wonders what happens in the possible worlds in which gaps
are absent. My opponent might claim that gaps are metaphysical
ly necessary, or, more plausibly, claim that in worlds without gaps
some component of the binary conception of hell would need to be
abandoned. I am somewhat inclined to object that it would be unbe
coming of God to use a criterion that would allow for possible cases
of injustice if applied in every possible world, even if those cases do
not actually arise.12
There are a number of things to say in reply to this. First, since God exists
in every possible world (or so we shall assume) and has his properties
essentially, it follows from the fact that God has overriding reasons not to
allow non-S-gappy worlds that it's not even metaphysically possible for a
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world to fail to be S-gappy.13 There is no manifest problem with this sug
gestion. Second, and more importantly, there is nothing morally suspect
about using a criterion to adjudicate between actual cases that can admit
of borderline cases. If I am to distribute medicine to large groups of people
and I use a criterion that gets the actual cases right then the possibility of
that criterion leading to morally objectionable distributions in other non
actual situations is just not relevant to the actual morality of my action.
This is especially obvious when I know that it will get the actual cases
right. We judge that a similar case applies to God's use of a criterion based
on a moral matter of degree. As long as there are no actual violations of
morality, there are no violations of morality.
U niversity o f R ochester an d U niversity o f South A labam a

NOTES
1. Faith and Philosophy Vol. 19, No. 1 (2002), pp. 58-68.
2. Ibid., p. 59.
3. There are independent reasons to question Proportionality. Proportion
ality rules out lottery-generated blessings. That's counter-intuitive. Egalitarian
principles of distributive justice might argue that divisible sums won in lot
teries be shared, but to deny the fortunate possession of an unshareable prize
would be a case of “leveling down" which is almost universally rejected as a
correct principle in ethical theory. See D. Parfit, “Equality or Priority" (Lindley
Lecture, University of Kansas Press), in The Ideal o f Equality, ed. M. Clayton and
A. Williams (New York: St. Martin's Press, and London: Macmillan, 1995).
4. Epistemicism is a view about the nature of vagueness which holds that
vagueness is a result of ignorance. For instance, suppose Bob is a borderline
case of baldness. It is unclear whether Bob is bald or not. Epistemicism ex
plains that this inability to judge whether Bob is bald or not arises because we
lack knowledge about the precise cut off for 'bald.' For details and defense see
Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (New York: Routledge, 1994). An epistemicist
response to the current problem would hold that we are ignorant of the pre
cise cut off regarding the criterion God uses to decide eternal fate. One might
think: “Well, epistemicism is intuitively crazy at first glance, but look at all the
problems it solves. Sider's argument is just another instance in which epis
temicism solves an intractable problem."
5. If one thought that a consequence of God's actualizing a world would
be that there would be borderline individuals with respect to their soteriological properties then one should think God may decide to send to Hell only the
“super-damnable." Admittedly there is higher-order vagueness: where's the
cut off between the super-damnable and the not superdamnable? But if the
choice is between actualizing a world in which only the superdamnable go to
the Hell and the rest go to Heaven or not, then if the world actualizes other
tremendous goods, creating that world wins the day.
6. See below (pp. 326-27) for a discussion of Sider's different claim that
the mere possibility of S-gappiness is sufficient to raise difficulties with the
targeted conception of Hell.
7. Sider, p. 65.
8. This borrows a phrase from famed nineteenth-century Freemason
Thomas Smith Webb. The full quote is a gem: “[A]nd although our thoughts,
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words and actions, may be hidden from the eyes of man, yet that All-Seeing
Eye, whom the Sun, Moon and Stars obey, and under whose watchful care
even comets perform their stupendous revolutions, pervades the inmost re
cesses of the human heart, will reward us according to our merits." Thomas
Smith Webb, The Freemasons Monitor or Illustrations o f Masonry (Salem, MA:
Cushing and Appleton, 1821), p. 66.
9. For a thorough discussion of this literature see Alvin Plantinga, War
ranted Christian Belief, (OUP: 2001), 465ff. See especially the papers referenced
at 466n.10.
10. For a recent defense of “skeptical theism" see Michael Bergmann and
Michael Rea, “In Defence Of Sceptical Theism," Australasian Journal o f Philoso
phy Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 241-51.
11. For a fairly detailed investigation of this, see James Montmarquet,
Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Rowman and Littlefield, 1993).
12. Sider, pp. 64-65.
13. Notice that there are lots of things that might at first have appeared
to be possible that aren't if there is a necessarily existing God who has all
powers essentially. To turn this into an objection to theism would require a
very strong tie between conceivability and possibility. In Conee and Sider's
Riddles o f Existence (OUP, 2005), chapter three, an objection is raised from
“vanishing possibilities" to the existence of a necessary being. The objection
is that lots of apparent possibilities vanish if there is a necessary being. A full
response to this objection is beyond the scope of this paper, but notice that
this argument cuts both ways: if a necessary being does not exist, then by S5
modal reasoning, a necessary being is impossible, but it seems possible. Fur
thermore, any interesting metaphysical thesis should be metaphysically nec
essary and thus make its apparently possible rivals metaphysically impos
sible, e.g., gunk theory or true atomic theory. Finally, we might have thought
it possible for water to be XYZ. The moral of the story is that metaphysical
possibility is not perspicuous.

